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Abstract
This paper applies revealed preference theory to the nonparametric statisti-
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to improve the power of nonparametric tests of revealed preference. The
tightest bounds on indiﬀerence surfaces and welfare measures are derived
using an algorithm for which revealed preference conditions are shown to
guarantee convergence. Nonparametric Engel curves are used to estimate
expansion paths and provide a stochastic structure within which to exam-
ine the consistency of household level data and revealed preference theory.
An application is made to a long time series of repeated cross-sections from
the Family Expenditure Survey for Britain. The consistency of these data
with revealed preference theory is examined. For periods of consistency with
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The attraction of revealed preference (RP) theory is that it allows an assess-
ment of the empirical validity of the usual integrability conditions without the
need to impose particular functional forms on preferences. Although developed
to describe individual demands by Afriat (1973) and Diewert (1973) following the
s e m i n a lw o r ko fS a m u e l s o n( 1938) and Houthakker (1950), it has usually been
applied to aggregate data but this presents a number of problems2.F i r s t , o n
aggregate data, ‘outward’ movements of the budget line are often large enough,
and relative price changes are typically small enough, that budget lines rarely
cross (see Varian (1982), Bronars (1987) and Russell (1992)). This means that
aggregate data may lack power to reject RP conditions. Second, if we do re-
ject RP conditions on aggregate data we have no way of assessing whether this
is due to a failure at the micro level or to the inappropriate aggregation across
households that do satisfy the integrability conditions but who have diﬀerent non-
homothetic preferences. By combining nonparametric statistical methods with a
revealed preference analysis of micro data we can overcome the problems we have
described.
We also have a number of other motivations for this study. First, paramet-
ric demand studies on micro data often reject Slutsky symmetry which is one
of the implications of utility maximisation subject to a linear budget constraint.
Amongst the many possible explanations for this rejection are that either we have
the ‘wrong’ functional form or that there exists no well-behaved form of prefer-
1We are grateful to James Banks, Laura Blow, Tom Crossley, Alan Duncan, Jin Hahn,
Hide Ichimura, Arthur Lewbel, Ian Preston, the co-editor and three anonymous referees as well
as seminar participants in Berkeley, Bonn, Bristol, Chicago, CREST, Copenhagen, Havard-
MIT, Northwestern, Iowa, Univeristy of British Columbia and University College Dublin for
helpful comments. This study is part of the program of research of the ESRC Centre for the
Microeconomic Analysis of Fiscal Policy at IFS. The ﬁnancial support of the ESRC and the
Danish SSF is gratefully acknowledged. Material from the FES made available by the ONS
through the ESRC Data Archive has been used by permission of the controller of HMSO. Neither
the ONS nor the ESRC Data Archive bear responsibility for the analysis or the interpretation
of the data reported here. The usual disclaimer applies.
2See Manser and McDonald (1988), and references therein.
1ences which can rationalise the data. Nonparametric analysis allows us to check
this. Second, it has proven diﬃcult to test for (global) negative semi-deﬁniteness
of the Slutsky matrix in parametric demand models. Using nonparametric re-
vealed preference analysis we can simultaneously test for both symmetry and
negative semi-deﬁniteness. Third, if the integrability conditions are not rejected,
we often wish to go on and use demand estimates for policy analysis. Using
parametric analysis there is always some uncertainty as to how much the welfare
conclusions are driven by functional form. If we employ nonparametric techniques
t h e nw ec a no b t a i nb o u n d so nw e l f a r ee ﬀects and use these bounds to judge the
importance of the choice of functional form on welfare conclusions. Fourth, the
nonparametric analysis can aid in the development of new and parsimonious para-
metric demand systems. Finally, we can extend the nonparametric analysis to
investigate revealed preference for conditional demands.
The layout of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present the speciﬁcs of
testing the Generalised Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP). We then develop
a method for choosing a sequence of total expenditures that maximise the power
of tests of GARP with respect to a given preference ordering. We term this the
sequential maximum power (SMP) path. We present some simulation evidence
that shows that our GARP tests have considerable power against some alterna-
tives, but not others. We then develop a method of bounding true cost of living
indices. Algorithms are presented which give ‘tightest’ upper and lower bounds
for indiﬀerence curves passing through any chosen point in the commodity space.
We also show how these methods can be used to calculate tight bounds on annual
inﬂation rates without making parametric assumptions.
Section 3 presents a framework for implementing our procedures by using
nonparametric Engel curves for each commodity. To do this we assume that
h o u s e h o l d si nt h es a m et i m ep e r i o da n dl o c a t i o nf a c et h es a m er e l a t i v ep r i c e s .
Under this assumption, the nonparametric Engel curves correspond to expansion
paths for each price regime. In estimation we address two key issues that arise
2when placing local average demands in a structural economic context. First, we
consider the problem of pooling nonparametric Engel curves across households
of diﬀerent demographic composition. We show that a partially linear model
that allows for demographic variation (see, for example, Robinson (1988)) has
the very unattractive property that it reduces to Piglog demands (budget shares
are linear in log total outlay) under homogeneity and symmetry. We then show
that the shape invariant model of H¨ ardle and Marron (1990) provides a theory
consistent generalisation to the partially linear semiparametric method of pooling
nonparametric Engel curves across households of diﬀerent composition. Second,
we allow for the endogeneity of log total expenditure in the nonparametric budget
share equations. This section concludes with a discussion of the issues surrounding
unobservable preference heterogeneity3. W ee v a l u a t et h eu s eo fl o c a la v e r a g e
demands in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity and derive a measure of the
bias that results in measuring the welfare cost of ﬁnite price changes.
In Section 4 we present an empirical investigation of revealed preference using
British Family Expenditure Survey data from 1974 to 1993. This long time series
of cross-sections is used to estimate the associated nonparametric Engel curves
for 22 goods, adjusted for endogeneity and demographic composition. We then
examine whether revealed preference theory can be rejected for particular sub-
periods of the data. From the asymptotic distribution theory for nonparametric
regression we are able to provide a statistical structure within which to examine
the consistency of data with revealed preference theory without imposing a global
parametric structure to preferences. The approach we adopt provides an alter-
native to the Afriat ineﬃciency measure explored in Famulari (1995) and Mattei
(1994). We ﬁnd that GARP is not rejected for long periods of our data for most
income groups. We also compute bounds for a true cost of living index over the
period and annual inﬂation rates. We compare these bounds to popular price
3Even taking a small number of households in diﬀerent price regimes usually leads to a
rejection of the nonparametric conditions (see Koo (1963), Mossin (1972) and Mattei (1994), for
example, and the recent paper by Sippel (1997) on the use of experimental data).
3index numbers and to other nonparametric bounds. The new bounds we derive
are shown to provide considerable improvements on classical revealed preference
bounds. Section 6 concludes with a summary of our results and a consideration
of future directions.
2. Individual Data and Revealed Preference
2.1. Revealed Preference and Observed Demands
Suppose we wished to test experimentally whether a particular agent had
‘rational’ and stable preferences. In the context of demand, we could do this by
facing the agent with a series of prices and total expenditures and testing whether
their demand responses satisfy the Slutsky conditions. Speciﬁcally, suppose we
have T periods, t = 1...T,a n dw ec h o o s eJ-vectors of (positive) prices pt and
(positive) total expenditures xt for each period. We assume that every agent
responds with a unique positive demand for each price vector and outlay:
Assumption 1. For each agent there exists a set of demand functions q(p,x):
<J+1
++ → <J
++ which satisfy adding-up: p0q(p,x)=x for all prices p and total
outlays x.
Thus we are implicitly assuming that preferences are strictly convex and lo-
cally non-satiated (but not necessarily transitive). For a given price vector pt we
denote the corresponding J-valued function of x as qt (x)( w i t hq
j
t (x) for good
j) which we shall refer to as an expansion path for the given prices. We shall also
have need of the following assumption:




t(x0) for all j and all
pt.
Thus increasing total outlay does not lead to a reduced demand for any good.
Adding up and weak normality imply that at least one of the inequalities in this
assumption is strict and that expansion paths are continuous.
For our hypothetical experiment we could observe the demands for the given
prices and total outlays and test whether the resulting series of prices and de-
4mands satisfy revealed preference tests. To do this we need to deﬁne a variety of
revealed preference relationships. We say that qt(xt)i sdirectly revealed weakly
preferred to q∗ if the latter is aﬀordable at period t prices and total expenditure
xt: pt
0qt (xt) ≥ p0
tq∗ which we write as qt (xt) R0 q∗. An alternative characteri-
sation is that q∗ is within the budget set deﬁned by (pt,x t). If the inequality in
this condition is strict then we say that qt(xt)i sdirectly revealed strictly preferred
to q∗ (qt (xt)P0q∗) since the agent could have obtained the latter more cheaply
(at the prices pt) but chose not to. In this case, of course, q∗ is in the interior of
the budget set deﬁned by (pt,x t).
Now consider any sequence of prices and total outlays {ps,pt,pu,...pv,pw;
xs,x t,x u,...xv,x w}.4 We say that the sequence of associated demand vectors
{qs(xs),qt(xt),qu(xu), ... qv(xv),qw(xw)} is preference ordered if qs (xs) R0
qt (xt), qt (xt) R0 qu (xu), ... qv (xv) R0 qw (xw). Thus a sequence of demands
is preference ordered if each demand is directly revealed at least as good as
the next one. Given this, we say that qs (xs)i srevealed weakly preferred to
qw (xw) if there is a preference ordered sequence starting at the former and
ending at the latter; we denote this by qs (xs)Rqw (xw). Suppose now that
we have qs(xs)Rqw (xw) and that we also have that the ﬁn a ld e m a n di nt h e
sub-sequence, qw (xw), is directly revealed strictly preferred to the ﬁrst demand
vector qs (xs) (that is, qw (xw)P0qs (xs)). In this case we say that this sub-
sequence fails GARP, the general axiom of revealed preference. We shall say
that a set of prices and demands fails GARP if any sub-sequence drawn from the
set fails GARP. To illustrate, suppose that we have ﬁve time periods and that
q4 (x4)R0q2 (x2), q2 (x2)R0q1 (x1)a n dq1 (x1)P0q4 (x4). Thus the sub-sequence
{q4 (x4),q2 (x2),q1 (x1)} fails GARP5 and consequently the set (q1 (x1),q2 (x2),
q3 (x3),q4 (x4),q5 (x5)) fails GARP.
4We remind the reader that the order matters for a sequence (so that {1,2,3} is diﬀerent
from {3,1,2}) but not for sets (so that the sets (1,2,3) and (2,3,1) are the same).
5Note that this does not necesarily imply that the sub-sequence {q1 (x1),q4 (x4),q2 (x2)}
fails GARP.
52.2. Choosing a Path for Comparison Points
Below we take the sequence of (absolute) prices {p1,p2,...pT} that is
given by our data set but we are free to choose the sequence of total expenditures
used in the comparisons above. When considering how to do this, there is a
well known problem with applying GARP tests to data to which Varian (1982)
refers in his applied work. This problem arises since, particularly with time series
data, income growth over time can swamp variations in relative prices (which are
what we are interested in). This is because real income growth induces outward
movements of the budget constraint and, combined with typically small period-to-
period relative price movements, this means that budget lines may seldom cross.
As a result, data often lacks power to reject GARP. Indeed, if we choose the xt’s
so that budget lines never cross then we can never violate the GARP conditions.
Clearly then, with a given set of relative prices the power of a revealed preference
test will depend critically on the choice of the outlay path (x1,x 2,...xT).
One possible solution is to choose a sequence of constant ‘real’ total expen-
ditures. Thus given x1 and a set of price indices (P1(p1),P 2(p2),...PT(pT)) we
could choose xt = x1Pt/P1. Although superﬁcially attractive this begs the ques-
tion of what price index to use. More importantly, even if the series of demands
generated in this way did satisfy GARP, we cannot be sure that any other series
of total expenditures ‘starting’ from x1 would also satisfy GARP. Instead of this,
we present an algorithm for determining a sequence of demands which maximises
the chance of ﬁnding a rejection given a particular preference ordering of the data.
Consider any sub-sequence (taken to be of length 5 for illustrative purposes)
of prices {ps,pt,pu,pv,pw}. Now take an outlay xu in period u with associated
demand qu(xu). We can construct a preference ordered sequence through qu(xu)
for this sequence of prices by using two recursive schemes, one forwards and the
other backwards. For the backwards part (the set of demands that are at least
as good as qu(xu)) we set total outlay in period t so that the period u quantity
bundle is just aﬀordable: ˜ xt = p0
tqu(xu). Thus ˜ qt = qt(˜ xt) is the ‘lowest’ point













on the period t expansion path which is directly revealed at least as good as
qu(xu). Then set ˜ qs = qs(p0
s˜ qt). Thus the sequence {˜ qs,˜ qt,qu(xu)} is preference
ordered.
To construct the path of quantities to which qu(xu) is weakly preferred, we
ﬁrst solve for the value of outlay in period v that satisﬁes xu = p0
uqv(xv), which
we denote ˜ xv,w i t hd e m a n d˜ qv = qv(˜ xv).6 This is constructed so that ˜ qv is the
‘ h i g h e s t ’d e m a n do nt h ep e r i o dv expansion path to which qu(xu) is directly re-
vealed weakly preferred. Then construct ˜ qw = qw(˜ xw)b ys e t t i n g˜ xv = p0
vqw(˜ xw).
By construction, the entire path — {˜ qs,˜ qt,qu(xu),˜ qv,˜ qw} — is preference ordered.
We term the path created in this way a sequential maximum power (SMP) path
through qu(xu). An SMP path is said to start (respectively, ﬁnish) at qu(xu)i f
the latter is the ﬁrst (respectively, the last) element in the sequence. Although we
do not denote it explicitly it is important to recognise that an SMP path is always
deﬁned relative to a sequence of time indices (in this illustration {s,t,u,v,w})
6Given continuity and weak normality of the expansion paths there always exists a unique
outlay and demand that satisﬁes this condition.
7and a point on an expansion path for one of these time periods (in this case,
qu(xu)). For example, {˜ qs,˜ qt,qu(xu)} is an SMP path ﬁnishing at qu(xu).
To illustrate why this gives maximal power for a particular sequence, consider
the three period, two good example in ﬁgure 2.1. Here the order of the sequence
is {3,2,1} ﬁnishing at q1(x1)s ot h a t{q3(˜ x3)R0q2(˜ x2)R0q1(x1)}.I nt h i sﬁgure
the shaded part of the period 3 budget line gives the demands which result in
a rejection of GARP. One can see that if we took any other preference ordered
path of demands with the same sequence (q3 (x3)R0q2(x2)R0q1(x1)) this would
reduce the length of this segment. This is because any such path pushes out the
period 3 budget line which reduces the chance of observing a GARP rejecting
demand in period 3 (if demands are weakly normal).7 More formally, we have:
Proposition 1. Suppose that the demand sequence
{qs (xs),qt (xt),qu (xu)...,qv (xv),qw (xw)}
rejects GARP. If demands are weakly normal then the SMP path for the same
sequence of periods ending at qw (xw):
{qs (˜ xs),qt (˜ xt),qu (˜ xu)...,qv (˜ xv),qw (xw)}
also rejects GARP.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Thus, if we test for GARP along a given SMP path ﬁnishing at qw(xw)a n d
we do not reject, then we can be conﬁdent that we would not reject for any other
preference ordered path which ﬁnishes at the same demand and maintains the
preference ordering implied by the SMP path. It is important to note that there
may be other preference orderings that ﬁnish at qw(xw)t h a td or e j e c tG A R Ps o
that our maximal power is always with respect to a particular sequencing of time
periods. In our empirical work below we always take the chronological sequence
ﬁnishing in period 1. It is important also to note that maintaining the ordering
of demands but choosing a diﬀerent end point — qw(x0
w) instead of qw(xw) — will
7This is valid for the true expansion path. In our empirical work below we use estimated
expansion paths. For these, there is the possibility that the precision of the estimated path is
such that although the length is reduced the probablility of rejection is not.
8result in a diﬀe r e n tS M Pp a t hw h i c hm a yv i o l a t eG A R P ,e v e ni ft h eS M Pp a t h
ﬁnishing at qw(xw) does not. This is easiest to see in the two good, two expansion
path case. Suppose, for example, expansion paths are such that GARP is not
rejected if we take an SMP path ﬁnishing at a low level of expenditure for one of
the demands. If the expansion paths cross and we consider an SMP path ﬁnishing
at an expenditure level above the crossing point, then we will reject GARP on
that path. To check this we take a number of quantile points in the x distribution
and apply the SMP procedure to demand sequences ending at qw(x)w h e r eqw(x)
i se v a l u a t e da te a c ho ft h e s eo u t l a y s .
2.3. The Power of Parametric and Revealed Preference Tests of Inte-
grability.
When considering tests of integrability, whether parametric or nonparamet-
ric, we must be careful to recognise that there are some alternatives against which
both modes of test will have low power. To illustrate with a well known example,
s u p p o s ew ed r a wal a r g ei n d e p e n d e n ts a m p l ee a c hp e r i o df r o mal a r g ep o p u l a t i o n
of agents. If each agent in each period chooses demands on their budget surface
by drawing from a uniform distribution on the budget surface then in general no
individual path of demands will be integrable. However the (population and sam-
ple) mean data will appear to be generated by a Cobb-Douglas utility function
with weights equal to the inverse of the number of commodities (see Becker (1962)
and Grandmont (1992)). Parametric and revealed preference tests are unlikely to
reject the integrability conditions for such data but it is not clear that we would
wish to characterise them as the outcome of a ‘rational’ procedure. Equally there
will be paths of relative prices which lead to low power tests of the integrability
conditions under certain alternatives. The extreme case is if we have no variation
in relative prices in which case, of course, we cannot estimate price eﬀects for
parametric models and we have only one expansion path for our GARP tests.
Thus many of the concerns with the power of tests of the integrability condi-
tions are common to both parametric and revealed preference tests. There is also
9a concern, however, that revealed preference tests are inherently lacking in power
(as compared with parametric tests) and will fail to reject ‘too often’. However,
we know from the discussion of the previous sub-sections that the nonparametric
approach can be used to test Revealed Preference conditions without recourse to
any parametric speciﬁcation of preferences. In the event that they do not reject,
parametric models will be able to improve on the bounds that we derive for cost
of living and welfare measurement using revealed preference alone. One possible
s t r a t e g yf o rf u t u r ew o r ki st og oo nt oc o n s i d e rﬂexible parametric models over
regions where the nonparametric tests do not fail. We emphasise again that one
of our concerns regarding currently used parametric models is that they may be
too inﬂexible and in particular they may unduly restrict diﬀerences in price eﬀects
between rich and poor.
To investigate this issue further we consider three alternative generating pro-
cesses that produce non-integrable demands: a random procedure, an integrable
path with measurement error and a path generated by a slow adjustment model.
All of the calculations below use the actual sequence of relative prices observed in
our data which is the relevant set of relative prices. For the random alternative
we suppose that the demand at any price/income conﬁguration is a draw from
a uniform distribution on the budget surface (just as we assumed for individual
agents in the illustration above but without the averaging). The SMP procedure
with a given sequence of prices is: choose x1 and draw the vector q1 from a uni-
form distribution on the budget surface given by (p1,x 1). Then set ˆ x2 = p0
2q1
and draw ˆ q2 from a uniform distribution on the new budget surface. Continue
for all T periods. We can show analytically that if we have only two periods and
two goods then GARP will only reject half of the time. This indicates low power.
On the other hand, as the number of periods grows the probability of rejecting
grows. The actual rejection probability depends on the number of periods and
the relative price variability. To illustrate this we take the actual sequence of rel-
ative prices we have in our data (for 22 goods over 20 years; details are given in
10the empirical section below) and generate demands according to this alternative.
We found that in 10,000 random simulated SMP paths we reject GARP every
time. This indicates that our procedure does have considerable power against
this particular alternative. However, a sceptic might argue that any procedure
that failed to reject the rationality of such an unstructured alternative would be
very poor indeed. Thus we also consider two other alternatives which are ‘close’
to integrable.
Our second procedure is to take a set of demands that are integrable and to
incorporate a multiplicative measurement error.8 Speciﬁcally, in each period we
draw a (22 × 1) vector of budget shares from a joint distribution in which each
budget share has a ﬁxed mean approximately9 equal to the average budget shares
in 1974; see Appendix C for details. This is equivalent to taking a Cobb-Douglas
utility function over 22 goods with ﬁxed budget shares and then multiplying by a
unit mean measurement error. Clearly, if we set the variance of the budget share
draws in this procedure to zero then we have a path of Cobb-Douglas demands
which satisfy GARP. Conversely, if we allow for a great deal of measurement
error then we shall almost certainly reject GARP. The critical issue, then is
how much measurement error is it reasonable to allow for? We calibrate this
to the variance of the budget shares in our data which gives an upper bound
on measurement error. We then take diﬀerent proportions of these variances
and simulate 10,000 times and record the proportion of rejections. We ﬁnd that
even very modest amounts of noise cause rejection. For example, if we allow for
only 0.5% (respectively 1% and 2%) of the total variance to be due to noise and
use these in our simulations then we reject 61%, (respectively, 87% and 97%) of
the time. Thus the GARP/SMP procedure has considerable power against this
alternative.
8An alternative interpretation is that for each price regime we generate a sample which is an
independent draw from the same population with a given distribution of heterogeneity over the
preference parameters.
9Adding-up implies that we need to normalise by the sum of random variables across all
shares. Consequently, the mean of the simulated errors on the budget shares will involve the
mean of the ratio of random varaibles. In our simulations this ratio has a mean close to unity.
11The third demand generating process we consider is a ‘naive’ adjustment
model. In this we assume that households adjust slowly to the optimum for the
prices in that period. Speciﬁcally, if we take (integrable) demands q(p,x), we set
the period t demand ˜ q(pt,x t)t o :
˜ q(pt,x t)=λq(pt,x t)+( 1 − λ)˜ q(pt−1,x t−1)f o rt =2 ,...T
Thus the sequence of demands will be integrable if we set λ = 1 but as adjustment
becomes slower, the likelihood of rejecting GARP increases. Note that this system
satisﬁes ‘long run’ integrability. For the demand functions we use a Quadratic
Almost Ideal System (QUAIDS) (see Banks et al (1997)) with parameters esti-
mated on our sample and the homogeneity and symmetry conditions imposed10.
For the ﬁrst period demands at a given outlay x1 we set q1 = q(p1,x 1)a n d ,a s
before, subsequent total expenditures are chosen using the SMP path for our price
data. Doing this, we ﬁnd that for the path starting at median ﬁrst period total
outlay, we reject GARP if and only if λ < 0.26. Such a low ﬁgure suggests that
our testing procedure is unlikely to have good power against an alternative that
satisﬁes the integrability conditions in the long run. Once again, we emphasise
that the same may be true of alternative parametric procedures.
2.4. Computing Tight Bounds on Welfare Measures
Afriat (1977) showed how revealed preference restrictions can be used to
provide information on the curvature of indiﬀerence surfaces in commodity space
and then used to set bounds on the welfare eﬀects of a price change. This is further
d e v e l o p e di nV a r i a n( 1982) and Manser and McDonald (1988). One problem
with applying this procedure to the aggregate data that the latter use is that
budget surfaces rarely cross so that the bounds from such data tend to be wide11.
10We do not impose the negativity conditions on our parameter estimates but we note that
the ‘full adjustment’ paths generated by our simulations starting at median total expenditure
do pass GARP.
11Varian (1983) and Manser and McDonald (1988) tighten the bounds using a maintained
hypothesis of homotheticity, but this is problematic since much empirical evidence suggests that
budget shares are not constant with respect to the total budget.
12Knowledge of expansion paths can greatly improve these bounds. Without loss of
generality we consider an indiﬀerence surface passing through some base bundle
q1 on the ﬁrst expansion path q1 (x). If GARP and weak normality hold then we
shall show that we can partition each expansion path, qt (x), into three distinct
segments. First, on any expansion path, there are the demands that can be shown
to be weakly revealed preferred to q1. Second, we have the demands that we can
show are weakly revealed dominated by q1. Finally there is an intermediate
segment with demands that cannot be revealed preference ordered with respect
to q1. We then show how knowledge of these segments for each expansion paths
allows us to construct tight bounds on the welfare costs of arbitrary price changes
from the base price p1.
We ﬁrst present an algorithm that we claim ﬁnds the ‘lowest’ point on each
e x p a n s i o np a t hs u c ht h a tw ec a ns h o wqtRq1; we term this the weakly preferred
set. We then show that if GARP and weak normality hold then this algorithm
converges in a ﬁnite number of steps and the weakly preferred set has the claimed
property.
Algorithm A.1 Input: a base bundle q1,p r i c ev e c t o r spt and expansion paths
qt (x)f o rt =2 ,..,T. Output: QB (q1).
1)S e tW = {q1,q2 (p0
2q1),....,qT (p0
Tq1)}
2) Set F = {q1,q2(minqt∈W {p0
2qt}),...,qT(minqt∈W {p0
Tqt})}.
3) If F ≡ W then set QB (q1)=W and stop. Else set W = F a n dg ot o( 2 ) .
The set QB (q1)h a sT elements, one for each expansion path; we denote the tth
element of QB (q1)b yqB
t . A discussion of this algorithm and the one following
and an illustration can be found in Appendix B. We have:
Proposition 2. If GARP and weak normality hold then:







Proof. See Appendix A.
The ﬁrst part of the proposition assures that the algorithm is feasible (it in fact
converges quite quickly in practice). The second part of the proposition veriﬁes
13that the algorithm identiﬁes the largest set of points on expansion paths that can
be shown to be revealed preferred to q1 w i t ht h ed a t at oh a n d . 12
We also have an algorithm that ﬁnds the ‘highest’ point on each expansion
path such that q1 can be shown to be revealed preferred to these points.
Algorithm A.2 Input: a base bundle q1 and price vectors pt and expansion
paths qt (x)f o rt = 1,2,..,T.O u t p u t :QW (q1).





2) Set F = {q1,maxqt∈W (q2 : p0
tqt = p0
tq2),...maxqt∈W (qT : p0
tqt = p0
tqT)}.
3) If F ≡ W then set QW (q1)=W and stop. Else set W = F a n dg ot o( 2 ) .
Denoting the t th element of QW (q1)b yqW
t we have the following results for
this algorithm:
Proposition 3. If GARP and weak normality hold then:
A. algorithm A.2 converges in a ﬁnite number of steps.






Proof. See Appendix A.
Finally we can show that for any t we have qB
t ≥ qW
t so that the two points
divide any expansion path into three connected segments (given weak normality).
Given the sets QW (q1)a n dQB (q1) we can derive bounds on the welfare ef-
fects of a price change. For example, suppose that we have a reference commodity
level q1 (on the expansion path q1 (x) )a n da na r b i t r a r ya b s o l u t ep r i c ev e c t o rpz.




where c(pz,q1) is the expenditure function giving the cost of attaining a bundle
indiﬀerent to q1 at prices pz. Bounds can be placed on this index using the two
12We could extend the weakly revealed preferred set to the whole commodity space by taking
















In section 5 we use these results together with nonparametric estimates of Engel
curves to compute upper and lower bounds on the true ﬁxed welfare base cost-of-
living index over the period 1974 to 1993 using British household budget survey
data. These are then compared to standard cost-of-living index formulae and to
alternative nonparametric and revealed preference bounds.
As well as being interested in ﬁxed welfare base cost-of-living indices which
span a period of, perhaps, several years, we are often even more interested in an-
nual inﬂation rates and with these it is typical to update the welfare base in each
period rather than let it get too out of date. For example the inﬂation rate be-
tween the adjacent years t and t+1 may be calculated as (c(pt+1,qt)/c(pt,qt))−
1. Bounds can easily be derived by ﬁnding the bounds on the indiﬀerence curve




















The inﬂation rate between t + 1 and t +2 c a nb em e a s u r e da s( c(pt+2,qt+1)/
c(pt+1,qt+1))−1 and a bound derived in an identical manner. In section 5 we
present annual inﬂation bounds for 1975 to 1993 derived in this way.
3. Nonparametric Engel Curves
3.1. Kernel Estimation of the Budget Share System
To estimate the expansion paths for each price regime we employ nonpara-
metric regression methods. Let {(lnxi,w ij)}n
i=1 represent a sequence of n house-
hold observations on the log of total expenditure lnxi a n do nt h ejth budget share
13Note that there is the possibility of corner solutions with respect to the lower bound whereby
the new price vector may cause one or more demands to fall to zero. To allow for this in the
calculation of the cost-of-living index the lower bound set QW (q1) needs to be augmented in
the following way







w : ∀ qw ∈ QW (q1)
ª
∪ QW (q1)
See Appendix B for an illustration.
15wij, for each household i f a c i n gt h es a m er e l a t i v ep r i c e s .F o re a c hc o m m o d i t yj,
budget shares and total outlay are related by the stochastic Engel curve
wij = gj(lnxi)+εij (3.1)
where we assume that, for each household i, the unobservable term εij satisﬁes
E(εij|lnx)=0a n dVa r(εij|lnx)=σ2
j(lnx) ∀ goods j = 1,..J (3.2)
so that the nonparametric regression of budget shares on log total expenditure
estimates gj(lnx).14 In (3.1), if preferences are Piglog15, gj is linear in lnx for all
goods j = 1,...,J.
In our empirical application we use the following unrestricted Nadaraya-




















Kh (lnx − lnxl), (3.5)
where h is the bandwidth and Kh(·)=h−1K(·/h) for some symmetric kernel
weight function K(.) which integrates to one. We assume the bandwidth h sat-
isﬁes h → 0a n dnh →∞as n →∞ . Under standard conditions the estimator
(3.3) is consistent and asymptotically normal, see H¨ ardle (1990) and H¨ ardle and
Linton (1994). Additionally, provided the same bandwidth and kernel are used to
estimate each gj(lnx), adding-up across the share equations will be automatically
satisﬁed for each lnx and there is no eﬃciency gain from combining equations.
This mirrors the invariance result for SURE systems with identical regressors (see
Deaton (1983), for example).
14Below we discuss how we allow for the endogeneity of lnx i nt h eE n g e lc u r v er e g r e s s i o n
equation.
15See Muellbauer (1975) and the empirical investigations by Working (1943) and Leser (1963).
These are the preferences that underly the popular Translog and Almost Ideal demand systems.
163.2. Demographic Composition and Semiparametric Estimation
Household expenditures typically display variation according to demographic
composition. A fully nonparametric approach would be to stratify by each distinct
household demographic type and estimate each Engel curve by nonparametric
regression within each cell. Given that this would result in relatively small sample
sizes within each cell, we choose to use a semiparametric speciﬁcation to pool
across household types.
Let zi represent a vector of discrete household composition variables for each
household observation i. A simple semiparametric speciﬁcation would be to as-
sume partial linearity (see Robinson (1988) and Powell (1987))
wij = gj(lnxi)+z0
iγj + εij (3.6)
with
E(εij|zi,lnxi)=0a n dVa r (εij|zi,lnxi)=σ2
j( zi,lnxi). (3.7)
in which γj represents a ﬁnite parameter vector of household composition eﬀects
for commodity j and gj(lnxi) is some unknown function as in (3.1).
Although the partially linear model (3.6) motivates the approach taken in this
paper, consideration of the integrability conditions indicate that some modiﬁca-
tion is required. This is because the additive structure underlying (3.6) together













requires that g(.) be linear.
Proposition 4. Suppose that budget shares have a form that is additive in func-
tions of lnx and demographics
wj (lnp,lnx,z)=mj (lnp,z)+gj (lnp,lnx)( 3 . 9 )
If (i) Slutsky symmetry (3.8) holds and (ii) the eﬀects of demographics on budget
shares are unrestricted in the sense that mj c a nv a r yi na n yw a yw i t hz then
gj (.) is linear in lnx:
Proof. See Appendix A.
17This proposition demonstrates that the additive form given in (3.9) will only be
consistent with utility maximisation if we restrict the way in which demographics
aﬀect budget shares, or if preferences are Piglog. That is gj(lnx)i sl i n e a ri nl nx
for all j.
An alternative speciﬁcation that we adopt which does not impose restrictions
on the form of gj, is the following extension of the partially linear model
wij = gj(lnxi − φ(z0
iθ)) + z0
iαj + εij (3.10)
in which φ(z0
iθ) is some known function of a ﬁnite set of parameters θ.16 This
function is common across share equations and can be interpreted as the log of a
general equivalence scale for household i17. Interestingly, the extended partially
linear model (3.10) is precisely the shape invariant speciﬁcation considered in the
work on pooling nonparametric regression curves by H¨ ardle and Marron (1990)
and Pinske and Robinson (1995).
To examine the shape invariant restrictions implicit in (3.10) we deﬁne s =
0,1,..,S distinct household types of group size ns and let zs represent the corre-
sponding demographic structure for each group normalised such that for the base
group s =0 , φ(z00
i θ)=z00
i αj = 0. The share equation for the base group (e.g. a





w h i l ef o rt h er e m a i n i n gf o rs = 1,..,Sgroups (e.g. couples with diﬀerent numbers




i θ)) + zs0
i αj + εs
ij. (3.12)
16Blundell, Duncan and Pendakar (1998) compare the semiparametric speciﬁcation used here
with this more general alternative and ﬁnd that it provides a good representation of demand
behavior for households in the British FES used in this study.
17For example, we may choose φ(z
0
iθ)=l n ( z
0
iθ)w h e r eθ is the vector of corresponding equiv-
alence scales. See Pendakur (1998), for example.
18In the remainder of this subsection we suppress the bandwidth parameter and use super-
scripts to represent the diﬀerent demographic groups.
18For any distinct household type zs
i the shape invariance restrictions relative to




i θ)) + zs0
i αj. (3.13)
If the αj and θ parameters for j = 1,....J − 1 w e r ek n o w nt h e nt h es h a p e
restricted gj could be estimated by kernel regression on the transformed data
lnxi−φ(zs0θ)a n dws
ij−zs0αj, pooled across the household types s =0 ,1,...,S. We
replace the αj and θ by
√
n consistent estimators and note that the asymptotic
properties of the kernel regression estimates of gj on the transformed data are
unaﬀected. The choice of estimator for αj and θ extends a method developed in
the H¨ ardle and Marron (1990) and Pinske and Robinson (1995) papers. The idea
is to replace each gs
j(lnxi) by its unrestricted Nadaraya-Watson kernel regression
estimator and choose αj and θ so as to minimise some weighted quadratic loss.19














J−1)a n dw h e r ex and x are integration limits on the log of
expenditure. The Λjs term is given by
Λjs(lnx;θ,αj)=rs
jf0 − fsr0
j(lnx − φ(zs0b θ)) − zs0αjfsf0(lnx − φ(zs0b θ))
where πs is a group speciﬁcw e i g h t( ns/n in our speciﬁcation) and $j(lnx)
is an equation-speciﬁc weighting function.20 This choice is equivalent to using
19In order to estimate these parameters there is no particular reason to use a kernel estimator
for this shape invariant model. An attractive alternative semi-parametric estimator would be to


































expression (3.13) can be weighted by the product of densities f
sf
0 where f
s is evaluated at lnxi
and f
0 at (lnx − φ(z
s0b θ)).
19(fsf0(lnx − φ(zs0b θ))2 as a weighting scheme for the H¨ ardle and Marron (1990)
estimator (3.14), and is precisely the estimator for random designs as suggested
b yP i n s k ea n dR o b i n s o n( 1995).
For the case where there are just two distinct groups S = 1 and one equation
J − 1 = 1, Pinske and Robinson show
√
n−consistency and asymptotic normal-
ity of this estimator of (θ,α). They also show that the ﬁrst order asymptotic
properties of the kernel regression estimator of b g under the shape invariant re-
strictions are unaﬀected by the use of b α0, b θ in place of α,θ.21 As noted above
the latter result is particularly useful in our case as we are not directly inter-
ested in α0,θ but rather in gj. Proposition 5 below extends their conditions for
√
n−consistency of (b α0, b θ) to the more general case of many groups and many
equations. Given this result we can then proceed to estimate the nonparamet-
ric Engel curves pooled across household types using the transformed variables
(wij − z0
ib αj)a n d( l nxi − φ(z0
i
b θ)).
Proposition 5 Let (b α0, b θ
0
)bet h ev a l u e so f( αj,θ)) that minimise the integrated





n−consistent estimator for (α0
0,θ0
0).
Proof. See Appendix A.
One important requirement for this proposition to hold (Assumption A6 in
Appendix A) is that fsf0(lnx − φ(zs0θ)) is bounded away from zero at the true
parameter value for θ. In our application we distinguish household types by fam-
ily size with the base group being a couple without children and choose the log
transformation for the equivalence scale function φ. Since the scale for children
relative to a childless couple is assumed to be bounded between zero and one half
for each child, condition A6 is preserved. In estimation we search in a neighbour-
hood of some reasonable starting values for θ drawn from the OECD child scales
and our ﬁnal estimator is close to these values.22
21In proving this result Pinske and Robinson (1995) allow for a diﬀerent bandwidth, nh
3 −→ ∞




22See Blundell, Duncan and Pendakur (1988) for a further discussion of the estimation of this
203.3. Endogeneity of Total Expenditure
To adjust for endogeneity we adapt the control function or augmented regres-
sion technique (see Holly and Sargan (1982), for example) to the semiparametric
Engel curve framework. Consider ﬁrst the nonparametric Engel curve (3.1). Sup-
pose lnx is endogenous in the sense that for each commodity j
E(εij|lnxi) 6=0o rE(wij|lnxi) 6= gj(lnxi). (3.16)
In this case the nonparametric estimator will not be consistent for the function
of interest. To be precise, it will not provide the appropriate counterfactual: how
will expenditure share patterns change for some ceteris paribus change in total
expenditure?
Suppose there exist instrumental variables ζi such that
lnxi = π0ζi + vi with E(vi|ζi)=0 . (3.17)
In the application below we take the log of disposable income as the excluded in-
strumental variable for log total expenditure, lnx.F u r t h e r ,w em a k et h ef o l l o w i n g
key assumptions
E(wij|lnxi,ζi)=E(wij|lnxi,v i)( 3 . 18)
= gj(lnxi)+ρjvi ∀ j. (3.19)
This implies the augmented regression model
wij = gj(lnxi)+ρjvi + εij ∀ j (3.20)
with
E(εij|lnxi)=0∀ j. (3.21)
Note that gj (lnxi)=E (wij|lnxi) − E (vi|lnxi) eliminating gj(lnxi)u s i n g
(3.20) yields
wij − E(wij|lnxi)=( vi − E(vi|lnxi))ρj + εij (3.22)
equivalence scale parameter.
21which suggests a weighted instrumental variable estimator for ρj by replacing the
conditional means E(wij|lnxi)a n dE(vi|lnxi) by their Nadaraya-Watson ker-
nel regression estimators b w(lnxi)a n db v(lnxi) respectively. Suitable instruments
would be I[ b f(lnxi) >b ].vi.
The resulting estimator of g(lnxi)i sg i v e nb y
b g(lnxi)= b w(lnxi) − b v(lnxi)b ρj. (3.23)
Note that the unobservable error component v in (3.22) is unknown. In estimation
v is replaced with the ﬁrst stage reduced form residuals
e vi =l nxi − b π0ζi (3.24)
where b π is the least squares estimator of π. Since b π and b ρ converge at
√
n the
asymptotic distribution for b g(lnxi) follows the distribution of b w(lnxi)−b v(lnxi)ρj.
Moreover, a test of the exogeneity null H0 : ρj = 0, can be constructed from this
least squares regression.23 In application we apply this procedure by augmenting
the semiparametric model (3.10).
3.4. Unobserved Heterogeneity
We turn now to the relationship between nonparametric Engel curves and
the average demands for a set of heterogeneous agents. For this discussion we
omit dependence on observed characteristics z. There are two alternative ways of
interpreting the impact of heterogeneity on the average demands estimated from
nonparametric Engel curve regression. We could assume individual demands are
rational and then ask for conditions on preferences and/or heterogeneity that
imply rationality for average demands. This is the approach of McElroy (1987),
23This method can be viewed as a special case of the method proposed in Newey, Powell and
Vella (1999). They adopt a series estimator for the regression of w on lnx and v. This generalises
the form of (3.17) and (3.20). We chose not to follow the fully nonparametric control function
approach here for two reasons. First in Blundell, Duncan and Pendakur (1998) it is shown that
adding additional terms makes little diﬀerence for estimating Engel curves on a sample from a
single year of British Family Expenditure Survey data. Second, for the computations in this
study we would also have to make this adjustment for each share equation in each time period
and also to adjust the asymptotics accordingly.
22Brown and Walker (1991)a n dL e w b e l( 1996). Alternatively, we could make no
rationality assumptions on individual demands and simply ask what conditions
enable average demands to satisfy rationality properties. This is the approach of
Becker (1962), Grandmont (1992) and Hildenbrand (1994).
Suppose for each good j we write average budget shares as
E[wj|lnx,p]=gj (lnx,p) (3.25)
then, if we let ε represent a vector of unobserved heterogeneity terms with
E[ε|lnx,p] = 0, a necessary condition for the average budget shares recovered by
the nonparametric analysis discussed above to be equal to average budget shares
is that
wj = gj (lnx,p)+φj (lnx,p)
0 ε. (3.26)
Notice this allows for quite diﬀerent tastes across agents. In particular, the ﬁrst-
order price and income responses for agents can vary in any way. Thus a good
may be a luxury for one person and a necessity for another.
The function gj (lnx,p) gives mean responses to changes in prices conditional
on a given level of total expenditure. Thus we can use this function for posi-
tive analysis, for example to recover the revenue implications from a change in
taxes. Additionally, the utility function that is associated with an integrable set
of demands gj (lnx,p) is a prime candidate for use in equilibrium models that
assume a representative agent. In our analysis below we apply the GARP tests
to the mean function gj (lnx,p). This averaging is very diﬀerent to the stan-
dard aggregation structure in consumer theory developed by Gorman (1954) and
Muellbauer (1976). In particular, we are not aggregating across diﬀerent total
budgets (incomes). Additionally, we are not assuming that individual demands
are necessarily integrable; that is, for given ε we can have that the Slutsky condi-
tions may fail for wj (lnx,p,ε). In this respect, our structure is closer to that of
Hildenbrand (1994) and Grandmont (1992). However, their analysis shows con-
ditions for average demands to satisfy the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference
(WARP, see Varian (1982)) but GARP requires more. GARP implies the Slutsky
23symmetry conditions. If we wish to impose integrability at the individual level
then there are restrictions on the φj (x,p) and the distribution of the heterogene-
i t yt e r m s( s e eM c E l r o y( 1987), Brown and Walker (1989) and Brown and Matzkin
(1995)).24 Indeed, Brown and Walker (1989) show that for Slutsky symmetry to
hold φj (x,p)m u s tb ee i t h e raf u n c t i o no f x or p.
The reason that we are interested in testing for GARP using these mean
responses is that without such a rationality condition holding, it is diﬃcult to
see how we would ever conduct coherent welfare analysis of non-marginal price
changes. The heterogeneity conditions for using the mean function for the welfare
analysis for consumers of a non-marginal price change are, however, stronger than
the conditions given in (3.26) which suﬃce for positive analysis. In an important
paper McElroy (1987) considers the case of estimating cost function and share
equation parameters for production analysis. For consumer welfare measures
these results need to be extended. Consider the welfare measure based on the




















Consequently in addition to the direct price eﬀect on the share (3.27) includes
the compensating income eﬀect
∂wj
∂ lnxwj. This introduces a bias term additional
to that considered in McElroy (1987). Using (3.26) the mean welfare measure


























24If all preference parameters are to be heterogeneous then preferences are essentially restricted
to the class of Piglog demands (see Lewbel (1996), for example).
25See Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1996), for example.
24where E{εε0|x, p} = Ωε. The ﬁrst two terms on the right hand side of this
expression can be computed using the mean function gj (.)s ot h a to u rm e a n
function gives an exact ﬁrst-order welfare eﬀect. It also gives second order eﬀects
if the ﬁnal bias term is zero. This will be the case if, for example, the heterogeneity
term φ(lnx,p) is independent of total expenditure so that all households have
t h es a m em a r g i n a li n c o m ee ﬀects.26
In general the error term in (3.26) will represent measurement and optimisa-
tion error as well as preference heterogeneity so it would seem natural to work with
local average demands. Averaging locally to each x eliminates unobserved hetero-
geneity, measurement error and (zero mean) optimisation errors in demands but
preserves any nonlinearities in the Engel curve relationship for each price regime.
4. An Empirical Investigation on Repeated Cross-Sections
4.1. Data
The data were drawn from the repeated cross-sections of household-level data
in the British Family Expenditure Survey (1974 to 1993). The FES is a random
sample of around 7,000 households per year. From this we used a sub-sample of
all the two-adult households both those with and those without children27.T h e
ﬁrst and last percentiles of the within-year total expenditure distribution in this
sub-sample was then trimmed out. This selection resulted in a sample size of
75,753 households (between 3,386 and 4,086 in each year). Expenditures on non-
durable goods by these households were aggregated into 22 commodity groups
and chained Laspeyres price indices for these groups were calculated from the
sub-indices of the UK Retail Price Index giving 20 annual price points for each
of our 22 commodity groups.
The commodity groups are non-durable expenditures grouped into: beer,
w i n e ,s p i r i t s ,t o b a c c o ,m e a t ,d a i r y ,v e g e t a b l e s ,b r e a d ,o t h e rf o o d s ,f o o dc o n -
26Note, however, that this condition is suﬃcient and not necessary; weaker assumptions suﬃce
to make the bias term zero or small.
27A further selection of households with cars was made in order to allow us to include motoring
expenditures and, in particular, petrol as commodity groups.
25sumed outside the home, electricity, gas, adult clothing, children’s clothing and
footwear, household services, personal goods and services, leisure goods, enter-
tainment, leisure services, fares, motoring and petrol28. Descriptive statistics for
total nominal expenditure are given in Table D.1 of appendix D.
4 . 2 .E s t i m a t e dE n g e lC u r v e sa n dN o r m a lG o o d s
The nonparametric regression results are based on a Gaussian Nadaraya-
Watson kernel estimation under the shape invariance restrictions (3.13). Adaptive
kernel bandwidths29 were used throughout with the ﬁrst round bandwidth chosen
by cross-validation [cf.H ¨ ardle (1990)].
The three ﬁgures (4.1 to 4.3) below show the estimated Working-Leser En-
gel curves (budget share against log total nominal expenditure) for 3 of our 22
commodities, for 3 of our 20 periods (1975 (circles), 1980 (squares), 1985 (tri-
angles)). These represent a typical necessity (bread), a luxury (entertainment)
and beer which roughly displays a quadratic logarithmic Engel curve behaviour.
On each Engel curve we plot the points on the chronological SMP paths which
correspond to the 1st, 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th and 99th percentile points in
the base year (1974). Pointwise 95% conﬁdence bands at these points are also
drawn. Note that, as we would expect, the precision is much lower at the tails
of the outlay distribution. The left to right drift of the Engel curves apparent
in these ﬁgure illustrates the growth in nominal expenditure which took place
between these periods.30
28More precise descriptions of components of the commodity groups are available from the
authors.










i ln b f
h (lnxi)
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see Blundell and Duncan (1998).
30A full set of non-parametric regression results are available from the authors on request.
These results conﬁrm the normal goods assumption used in the discussion above.
26Figure 4.1: The Engel curve for Bread
Figure 4.2: The Engel curve for Entertainment
Figure 4.3: The Engel curve for Beer
274.3. Testing GARP
At each stage in the empirical analysis of the GARP conditions we will














s(xs)xs for s 6= t. (4.1)
where b gj







































are known constant weights in each
price regime.
To test GARP we will need to evaluate the inequality (4.2) at particular
points on an SMP path. Since the nonparametric Engel curve has a pointwise
asymptotic normal distribution we can evaluate the distribution of each b g
j
t(x)a t
any point x.31 For (4.2) we need to ﬁnd the distribution of the weighted sum of





s(x). However, since on any SMP
path in any period the b gj(x) kernel estimates for each good j a r et ob ee v a l u a t e d
31Brieﬂy, for bandwidth choice h and sample size n the variance can be well approximated at
















with weights from the kernel function
ωjh(x)=Kh(x − xj)/fh(x)
see H¨ ardle (1990).
28using the same kernel smoother and the same bandwidth, the expression for the
asymptotic variance of the weighted sum simpliﬁes. In particular, the constants
associated with the kernel function and the density fh(x) itself will be common
to all variance and covariance terms. Pointwise standard errors and conﬁdence
bands for expression (4.2) are therefore tractable and are used extensively in the
empirical application below.
When calculating demands on SMP paths we allow for the fact that the total
expenditure levels in all periods except for the ﬁrst are chosen on the basis of the
estimated demands in the previous periods. For example, a SMP path constructed
such that e xt = p0
tqt = p0











t−1(xt−1)xt−1and therefore e xt depends on the estimate of b gt−1 (xt−1)






and that this takes into account that e xt is set according
to estimates of gt−1 (xt−1) (and likewise that e xs is set according to estimates of
b gr (e xr) etc.). This is derived using the standard delta-method approach applied
sequentially.
Table 4.1: Number of rejections of GARP, by size of test.
Starting point for α
each comparison path 1.0 0.30 0.20 0.10 0.05
SMP paths:
1st percentile 1 0 0 0 0
1st decile 1 1 0 0 0
1st quartile 1 0 0 0 0
Median 1 1 1 1 0
3rd quartile 2 2 0 0 0
9th decile 11 6 3 1 0
99th percentile 28 21 1 0 0
Median path 0 0 0 0 0
Mean path 0 0 0 0 0
29To implement our procedure we need to choose a set of SMP paths along
which to evaluate GARP. To do this we select the starting points for each path to
be at the 1st percentile, 1st decile, 1st quartile, median, 3rd quartile, 9th decile
and 99th percentile points in the x distribution for 1974, the ﬁrst year in our data
set. The comparison points for the following years are chosen along the SMP path
a sd e s c r i b e di ns e c t i o n2 . 2 . B yP r o p o s i t i o n1 we know that if this path passes
GARP then no path which preserves the same preference ordering will violate
GARP. The annual median and mean (non-SMP) paths are also computed for
comparison.
Table 4.1 shows the number and pattern of rejections for the system of 22
goods. Each column provides a count of the total number of rejections according
to inequality (4.2). In each case a one sided test of size α is used, based on the





s(xs). The column headed α = 1
counts the number of rejects using inequality (4.2) directly without adjustment for
estimation error in gj
s(xs). In the remaining columns each inequality is adjusted
by a one sided interval. From the ﬁrst of these columns GARP can be seen to
be rejected for a large number of points, especially in the upper tail of the outlay
distribution.32 However, these rejections are not statistically signiﬁcant. Very
little adjustment is needed to dramatically reduce the number of rejections.33
It is also interesting to observe that there are no rejections, even in the raw
d a t a ,f o rt h em e d i a no rm e a n( non-SMP) paths. This is consistent with the
observation which arises in tests of GARP on aggregate data that if the budget
constraint is allowed to shift much either way between comparison points, as it
does for median or mean total expenditure, then there is little chance of being
able to ﬁnd demands that cannot be rationalised.
32Our interest is primarily in the points commonly used in the analysis of income distributions,
i.e. interdecile points, interquartile points and the median. We include the 1st and the 99th
percentile points for completeness.
33We have not attempted to compute the size of the implicit joint test.
304.4. Continuous Sub-Periods Which Satisfy GARP
Using the same set of SMP comparison points as in table 4.1, table 4.2
presents the continuous sub-periods of the data that satisfy GARP. For example,
the chronological SMP path which starts at median total budget in 1974 runs
into a violation of GARP when 1986 is added to the sequence. In this case it
is the pair of years 1985 and 1986 which fail to satisfy GARP: the SMP path is
constructed to reﬂect the ordering q86R0q85 but we ﬁnd that q85P0q86, giving
the violation.
Table 4.2: Continuous periods that satisfy GARP.
Periods








Interestingly, the table also shows the largest continuous sub-period in which
w ea r ea b l et ob o u n dt h ei n d i ﬀerence curve. For example, using the reference de-
mand bundle at median total outlay in 1974 we are able to bound a curve using
the expansion paths and price data for 1974 to 1985 inclusive (we are also able
to bound curves using reference demands at any within-year median total expen-
diture level or reference demands at any point on the on the chronological SMP
path between 1974 and 1985). However, if we add 1986 to the set of admissible
periods the algorithm fails to converge. We then start again using the 1986 point
on the median SMP path as our starting point. In all, for the median we ﬁnd
the entire period separates down into two sub-periods within which we are able
t ob o u n da ni n d i ﬀerence curve. Similarly the 1st and 9th decile paths break into
31two and four sub-periods respectively, while the 99th percentile breaks down into
ﬁve.
We can use this knowledge of periods in which GARP is satisﬁed in a number
of ways. To illustrate two of them we present bounds on the base-period reference
cost-of-living index, and bounds on year-to-year inﬂation rates.
4.5. Bounds on the True Cost-of-living Index
Table 4.2 shows that preferences on the SMP paths starting at the 10th
a n d9 0 t hp e r c e n t i l ep o i n t s ,t h eq u a r t i l e sa n dt h em e d i a no ft h eb a s ep e r i o dt o t a l
budget distribution all satisfy integrability at least up until 1985. We use the data
for this period and the algorithms described in section 2.4 to bound the true cost-
of-living index c(p85,q74)/c(p75,q74) for a reference demand bundle at each of
these points in the 1974 total budget distribution. Figure 4.4 shows the bounds for
each reference budget in 1985, with 1974=1000. It is interesting to note that the
bounds for 10th and 90th percentile points do not overlap and indicate greater
rise on the cost of living for poorer, compared to richer, households over this
period.
We also compare the performance of the GARP bounds for the true index
with other nonparametric bounds and other popular price index formulae over a
longer period. This is shown in table 4.3. The ﬁrst panel shows the price index
numbers for the Paasche, Laspeyres and the chained T¨ ornqvist. These indices
can also be thought of as corresponding exactly to true indices under various
assumptions regarding the precise form of preferences34. The second panel in
table 4.3 shows various nonparametric bounds on the true index referenced at
q74 where q74 = q74 (x)e v a l u a t e da t1974 median total budget. The bounds
provided by Lerner (1935-36) are simply a reﬂection of the idea that the true
index (being a weighted average of price changes) must lie somewhere between
34The Paasche and Laspeyres, for example, are exact for Leontief preferences, the T¨ ornqvist
is exact for translog.
32Figure 4.4: GARP Cost of living index bounds 1985 by percentile point
(1974=1000).
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Pollak (1971) improves this by linking Lerner’s result with the original Kon¨ us
(1924) result that the Laspeyres index approximates the true base-referenced





















The bounds from classical revealed preference restrictions of the type used by
Varian (1982) and calculated using the demands in each period at median within-
period total budget are also reported (labelled classical RP). None of these non-
parametric solutions have any trouble in providing bounds for the entire period.
The classical bounds for example, do not violate GARP for the reasons explained
above. However, the bounds derived by our method must take account of the
break between 1985 and 1986. This is because when we seek to derive the bounds
using the data from both 1985 and 1986 the algorithms do not converge (conver-
gence requires GARP as shown in propositions 2 and 3). Instead we bound the
33indiﬀerence curves using prices and expansion paths from all periods excluding
1986. We then use these to bound the cost-of-living index using all of the price
data (including 19 8 6 )a sd e s c r i b e di n2 . 2 .
Table 4.3: Popular price indices, nonparametric and GARP bounds, 1974 to 1993.
Price Indices Nonparametric/RP bounds
Year PL T Lerner Pollak Classical RP GARP
74 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
75 1215 1232 1223 [1025,1721][ 1025,1232] [1206,1232] [1214, 1228]
76 1516 1530 1528 [1182,1985] [1182,1530] [1431,1530] [1514, 1530]
77 1762 1787 1783 [1239,2590] [1239,1787] [1700,1787] [1761, 1781]
78 19311 957 1960 [1385,2513] ][1385,1957] [1894,1957 [1936, 1957]
79 2086 21192 121 [1461,2636] [1461,2119] [2058,2119] [2093, 2119]
80 2463 25142 5 14 [1734,3142] [1734,2514] [2442,2514] [2478, 2509]
81 2780 2841 2841 [1770,4077] [1770,2841] [2687,2841] [2801, 2838]
82 3093 3189 3178 [1821,4287] [1821,3189] [2983,3189] [3123, 3172]
83 3260 3381 3371 [1828,4924] [1828,3381][ 3 197,3381] [3314, 3369]
84 3408 3558 3534 [1790,4921][ 1790,3558] [3335,3558] [3473, 3530]
85 3551 3733 3700 [1836,5086] [1836,3733] [3546,3733] [3634, 3696]
86 3700 3911 3876 [1900,5463] [1900,3911] [3595,3911] [3808, 3873]
87 3825 4035 3991 [1920,6049] [1920,4035] [3626,4035] [3918, 3989]
88 3922 4163 4113 [1923,6143] [1923,4163] [3702,4163] [4036, 4110]
89 4130 4379 4322 [1996,6397] [1996,4379] [3688,4379] [4240, 4319]
90 4406 4669 4608 [2079,6637] [2079,4669] [3739,4669] [4521, 4604]
91 4723 5044 4967 [2109,7507] [2109,5044] [4073,5044] [4871, 4963]
92 4996 5437 5323 [2091,8353] [2091,5437] [4038,5437] [5214, 5318]
93 5177 5650 5499 [2066,9098] [2066,5650] [3990,5650] [5382, 5493]
Notes: P = Paasche. L = Laspeyres, T = Chained T¨ ornqvist/Divisa
We ﬁnd, conﬁrming the results in Varian (1982) and Manser and McDonald
(1988), that classical non-parametric/revealed preference bounds based on the
median demand data gives little additional information on the curvature of the
indiﬀerence curve through commodity space and hence the bounds on the true
index are wide. However, by the use of expansion paths we can dramatically
improve these bounds. This is illustrate in ﬁgure 4.5 in which the GARP bounds
34Figure 4.5: GARP bounds and classical RP bounds, 1974 to 1993.
are represented by the solid lines and the classical RP bounds by the dashed line.
Comparing the GARP bounds on the true, ﬁxed base cost of living index
to the three price index number formulae we see that the chained T¨ ornqvist.
performs the best as an empirical approximation to the true index35.T h i s i s
despite the fact that, as an index in which reference utility is updated in each
period, the T¨ ornqvist. cannot strictly be compared to a ﬁxed base true index.
The Laspeyres, which is a ﬁrst order approximation to the true index in question,
understates the true increase in the cost of living by between about 3% and 5%
b yt h ee n do ft h ep e r i o d .
4.6. Bounds on Annual Inﬂation Rates
As well as deriving bounds on ﬁxed base cost-of-living indices, revealed pref-
erence restrictions can also be calculated on annual inﬂation rates in which the
reference demand bundle is updated in each period. The 1990 annual inﬂation
bound rate for example is calculated from the bound on the 1989-based cost-of-
living index c(p90,q89)/c(p89,q89). T h er e s u l t sa r es h o w ni nT a b l e4 . 4w h e r e
35Comparisons with other price indices are available from the authors.
35the improvement aﬀorded by the GARP bounds over the previously available
nonparametric bounds is apparent. Indeed the tightness of the GARP bounds is
remarkable. Again the T¨ ornqvist performs the best of the index number formulae
followed by the Laspeyres which is often close to the top of the GARP bounds.
Note that the inﬂation rate for the year to 1986 is missing from the GARP bounds
because of the GARP violation between these two years.
Table 4.4: Annual inﬂation rates for popular price indices, nonparametric and
GARP bounds, 1975 to 1993 .
Price Indices Nonparametric/RP bounds
Year PLT Lerner Pollak Classical RP GARP
75 21.48 23.16 22.28 [2.50,72.10] [2.50,23.16] [20.59,23.16] [21.47,22.85]
76 24.60 25.27 24.93 [5.00,54.13] [5.00,25.27] [17.86,25.27] [24.57,25.27]
77 16.54 16.89 16.71 [4.82,30.51] [4.82,16.89] [13.82,16.89] [16.50,16.80]
78 9.85 10.05 9.95 [-12.93,20.17] [-12.93,10.05] [-12.93,10.05] [9.83,10.05]
79 8.138 . 3 1 8.22 [0.17,15.39] [0.17,8.31][ 0 . 17,8.31] [8.13,8.31]
80 18.29 18.74 18.51 [7.75,49.92] [7.75,18.74] [8.00,18.74] [18.56,18.55]
81 12.92 13.11 13.02 [2.08,29.76] [2.08,13.11] [9.22,13.11] [13.11,13.11]
82 11.53 12.18 11.85 [-0.93,32.21][ - 0 . 9 3 , 12.18] [8.69,12.18] [11.51,12.02]
83 5.95 6.186 . 0 6[-6.97,25.32] [-6.97,6.18] [-6.97,6.18] [6.05,6.14]
84 4.80 4.91 4.86 [-2.06,21.00] [-2.06,4.91] [-2.06,4.91] [4.88,4.91]
85 4.65 4.72 4.69 [-3.18,12.77] [-3.18,4.72] [-3.18,4.72] [4.72,4.72]
86 4.77 4.73 4.75 [0.70,8.64] [0.70,4.73] [1.36,4.73] —
87 2.89 3.04 2.97 [-10.30,10.73] [-10.30,3.04] [-0.22, 3.04] [2.88,3.04]
88 3.06 3.04 3.05 [-4.50,8.87] [-4.50,3.04] [-0.60,3.04] [3.04,3.04]
89 5.07 5.11 5.09 [-0.39,10.48] [-0.39,5.11][ - 0 . 3 9 , 5 . 11] [5.06,5.10]
90 6.59 6.65 6.62 [1.38,10.50] [1.38,6.65] [1.38,6.65] [6.63,6.63]
91 7.78 7.81 7.80 [1.45,14.94] [1.45,7.81] [8.04,7.81] [7.81,7.81]
92 7.07 7.24 7.16 [-0.85,18.90] [-0.85,7.24] [6.59,7.24] [7.09,7.24]
93 3.28 3.34 3.31 [-8.03,9.58] [-8.03,3.34] [-7.69,3.34] [3.34,3.34]
Notes: P = Paasche. L = Laspeyres, T = T¨ ornqvist/Divisa
5. Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we have applied nonparametric statistical methods to the non-
parametric theory of consumer demand. We exploit the idea that price taking
individuals in the same market at the same time face the same relative prices, in
36order to smooth across the demands of individuals for each common price regime.
We ﬁrst show that knowledge of budget expansion paths can improve the power of
nonparametric tests of revealed preference theory. In cases in which revealed pref-
erence conditions are violated we could use an Afriat-Varian conditional demand
approach but we leave that for future work. We also show how budget expansion
paths can be used to place tight bounds on level sets of utility in commodity space
and hence to provide tight nonparametric bounds on true cost-of—living indices.
We present algorithms for the computation of these bounds.
Expansion paths can be estimated by nonparametric Engel curves and this
is shown to provide a useful stochastic structure within which to examine the
consistency of individual data and revealed preference theory. The implications
for pooling across households with diﬀerent demographic composition are also
examined and an appropriate semiparametric estimator is derived.
Using a long time series of repeated cross-sections from the 1974-1993 British
Family Expenditure Surveys we estimate semiparametric Engel curves and ex-
amine whether revealed preference theory is rejected. We show that GARP is
not rejected for long periods, particularly when we allow for sampling/stochastic
variation. We derive bounds on cost-of-living indices from our analysis which are
much tighter than those based on the revealed preference restrictions implied by
demands at, say, annual mean total expenditure. We also note that the chained
T¨ ornqvist (approximate Divisia) cost-of-living index performs well as a empirical
approximation to the true base-period referenced index.
37Appendices
A. Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
Without loss of generality we take the GARP rejecting preference ordered sub-
sequence to be {qs(ˆ xs),qt(ˆ xt),qu(ˆ xu)}.W eh a v e :
(1)ˆ xs = p0
sqs(ˆ xs) ≥ p0
sqt(ˆ xt)a n d
(2) ˆ xt = p0
tqt(ˆ xt) ≥ p0
tqu(ˆ xu)a n d
(3) ˆ xu = p0
uqu(ˆ xu) > p0
uqs(ˆ xs).
We consider the SMP path for this preference ordered sub-sequence and show
that it too rejects GARP. The SMP path {qs(˜ xs),qt(˜ xt),qu(ˆ xu)} has:
(4) ˜ xt = p0
tqt(˜ xt)=p0
tqu(ˆ xu)a n d
(5) ˜ xs = p0
sqs(˜ xs)=p0
sqt(˜ xt).
By construction this is a preference ordered sub-sequence (qt(˜ xt)R0qu(ˆ xu)a n d
qs(˜ xs)R0qt(˜ xt)) so that this sub-sequence rejects GARP if qu(ˆ xu)P0qs(˜ xs); that
is, if:
(6) p0
uqu(ˆ xu) > p0
uqs(˜ xs).
Conditions (2) and (4) imply p0
tqt(ˆ xt) ≥ p0
tqt(˜ xt)w h i c hi m p l i e sˆ xt ≥ ˜ xt.
This and conditions (1)a n d( 5 )g i v e :
p0
sqs(ˆ xs) ≥ p0
sqt(ˆ xt) ≥ p0
sqt(˜ xt)=p0
sqs(˜ xs)
which implies ˆ xs ≥ ˜ xs. Finally, condition (3) and normality imply p0
uqu(ˆ xu) >
p0
uqs(ˆ xs) ≥ p0
uqs(˜ xs) which is condition (6); hence GARP is rejected for this
sub-sequence.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .
PART A. We denote the sets F and W at the end of iteration s by F(s) and









The ﬁrst step is to show that as we iterate we never move ‘up’ an expansion path.






To see this, consider q
(s+1)
t ∈ F(s+1). At iteration s+1 step (2) of the algorithm




tqw for all qw ∈ W(s) = F(s).
Since the latter contains q
(s)
t we have the claimed inequality.
The next step is to show that if GARP and weak normality hold then for any



















This is a ‘no swapping’ condition which states that if we change qt to be just
revealed preferred to q
(s)
u then we never have that q
(s)
u is revealed preferred to
38q
(s)







































Now deﬁne the set:
¯ Q(q1)={q : q is on some SMP path that ﬁnishes at q1}
Thus we take all the sub-sequences of {2,3...T} (for example, {4,2,7}), construct
the SMP paths that ﬁnish at q1 and include all the points on these paths in ¯ Q(q1).
Since there are only a ﬁnite number of permutations of subsets of {2,3...T} this




t ∈ ¯ Q(q1)
We prove this by induction. Consider ﬁrst F(1) and q
(1)
t . Step 2 of the algorithm












an SMP path (with no second element if u = t). Thus all the elements of F(1)
are contained in ¯ Q(q1). To continue with the induction proof, suppose that all
of the elements of F(s) are on SMP paths. To show that all of the elements of
F(s+1) are on SMP paths, we need only consider an element that changes between














u is in F(s) it is on an SMP path ending at q1. Denote the part of








. The no swapping condition above
(which requires GARP) ensures that this path does not contain a demand on the
tth expansion path. Thus we put q
(s+1)
t at the start of this SMP path to create
a new SMP path. Thus q
(s)
t ∈ ¯ Q(q1) for all t implies q
(s+1)
t ∈ ¯ Q(q1) for all t.
Since q
(1)
t ∈ ¯ Q(q1) for all t, this establishes the result.
The ﬁnal part of the proof is to simply note that since our algorithm chooses
points from a ﬁnite set ¯ Q(q1) and discards a ﬁnite number of points at each






⇒ (qtRq1) follows from the construction of ¯ Q(q1) in part
A. To prove the converse let qtRq1. This requires that there be a preference
ordered path that starts at qt and ends at q1. Without loss of generality let this










39Recalling that we denote the tth element of QB (q1)b yqB
















From (A.6) and (A.3) and weak monotonicity we have qv ≥ qB
v . This and
(A.2) and (A.5) gives qu ≥ qB
u . From (A.4) and (A.1)w et h u sh a v eqt ≥ qB
t .
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .
The proof is analogous to that for Proposition 2.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 .
Given the budget share form of the Slutsky equation (3.8) and the additive struc-
ture in (3.9) we have by diﬀerentiating both side of (3.8) with respect to lnx then













z are allowed to be zero then this implies gj
xx = gk
xx =0 .
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 .
Assumptions:
A1: εs
ji are assumed mutually independent and have ﬁnite second moments
A2: E(εs
ji|lnx,zs)=0
A3: lnxi is independently distributed with density b fs(·) that is two times bound-
edly diﬀerentiable.
A4: b fs(·)(b rs(·))2 are two times boundedly diﬀerentiable functions.
A5: (α0,θ0) is in a bounded and open set.
A6: The twice boundedly diﬀerentiable weight function $, is non-negative and
positive only on the interior of a compact interval Ξx. For all points x ∈ Ξx we have
that fs(lnx) > 0a n dt h a tf o ra l l( α0,θ0),x,z∈ Θ×Ξ that f0(lnx−φ(zs0θ)) > 0.
A7: No parameter vector (α0,θ0) 6=( α0
0,θ0
0) exists such that for some j, gs
j(lnx)=
zs0αj + g0
j(lnx − φ(zs0θ)) almost all x ∈ Ξx.
A8: The same kernel is used for all s =0 ,1,..,S groups with bandwidth nsh5 −→
∞,n sh6 −→ 0a sns −→ ∞.
With assumptions A1 - A8 in place, Proposition 5 follows directly from Lemmas
1-6 and Theorem 1 i nP i n s k ea n dR o b i n s o n( 1995).
Discussion of assumptions in Proposition 5:
A1-A4 are standard assumptions and follow from the model speciﬁcation in
sections 3.1 and 3.2. A5 relates to the adult equivalence scale parameters for chil-
dren (relative to the base case of a couple with no children). As pointed out in
t h et e x t ,t h e s ea r eb o u n d e db e t w e e nt h ea d u l ts c a l ea n dz e r o .G i v e nt h eb o u n d -
edness of θ,f 0(lnx − φ(zs0θ)) > 0 follows. A7 is guaranteed by assuming that
at least one good has strictly nonlinear Engel curves (actually nonlinear relation-
ship between the share and log total expenditure). This has been established in
40many empirical applications to UK data (see Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1997),
for example). A8 follows from our common choice of kernel and the bandwidth
condition is satisﬁed under cross validation.
B. Welfare Bound Algorithms
B.1. Illustration of Algorithm A.1
Figure B.1 illustrates the algorithm36.W e d e n o t e t h e s e t s W and F in the
n’th iteration by Wn,F n.I n t h e ﬁrst iteration step (1) begins with W1 =
{q1,q2 (x0
2),q3 (x0




3q1.C l e a r l y q4P0q2 and






Because W1 6= F1 we set W2 = F1 a n dg ot os t e p( 2 )a tt h es e c o n di t e r a t i o n .
Now F2 = {q1,q2 (x0
2),q3 (x0
3),q4 (x0
4)} and in step (3) the iteration ends deﬁn-
ing QB (q1)={q1,q2 (x0
2),q3 (x0
3),q4 (x0
4)}. Algorithm A.2 proceeds in a similar
way giving QW =
©




but A.2 has the ad-
ditional step which identiﬁes the ﬁnal two points on the q1 =0a n dq2 =0a x e s .
The dashed lines marked ‘upper’ and ‘lower’ shows the bounds on c(pz,u(q1))
given by min{p0
zqt|qt ∈ QW (q1)} and min{p0
zqt|qt ∈ QP (q1)} for some new set
of relative prices pz.





















36We subscript the sets deﬁn e da te a c hs t a g eb yt h ec u r r e n ti t e r a t i o no ft h ea l g o r i t h m s .
41C. Simulating measurement error
Given a period t total outlay xt we set expenditure on good j in that period equal
to γjtxt for j = 1,2...,J.W ec h o o s et h eγjt weights in the following way. First, we
draw ˜ γjt from a Beta distribution with parameters (aj,b j) (where the distribution
parameters are kept constant over time). To do this, we ﬁrst have to calibrate the
two parameters for each good. To ﬁxo n ep a r a m e t e rw es e tE(˜ γjt)=ωj where
the latter is a given budget share (see below). Given the usual expression for the





for each good j. It only remains to calibrate the aj parameters. The variance of

















Thus we ﬁrst choose (ωj,σ2
j) for each good and then calculate (aj,b j)f o rj =
1,2...,J. Given these parameters we can simulate a set of budget weights for







Although the marginals of the joint distribution of the γjt’s are now no longer
a Beta distribution and the weights do not have the desirable property that
E(γjt)=ωj we do have that the mean is approximately equal to the data mean
(using conventional expansion arguments on the mean of a ratio) and bounded
between zero and unity, which suﬃces for our purposes. It only remains to choose
the mean and variances discussed above. We use data from one representative
year (1974) and set the budget shares ωj’s equal to the mean budget shares.
For the variance, we ﬁrst take the variance of each budget share, denoted ¯ σ2
j for
good j. We take this to be an upper bound for noise in the measurement and
then choose an attenuation factor ρ to give the calibrating variance σ2
j = ρ¯ σ2
j for
each good. Thus an attenuation factor of unity gives the maximum noise and an
attenuation factor of zero gives no noise.
42D. Data
Table D.1: Total nondurable nominal expenditure: Annual descriptive statistics.
Year No. of Obs Mean Std Dev. 10% 50% 90%
1974 3386 39.11 17.95 20.41 35.19 62.93
1975 3696 47.172 1.17 24.83 42.36 75.92
1976 3553 52.79 24.20 27.75 47.23 84.15
1977 3683 60.94 27.71 31.87 54.83 98.65
1978 3583 67.84 31.33 35.34 60.78 108.76
1979 3476 79.18 37.04 40.36 71.42 127.72
1980 3717 92.84 43.07 47.67 82.77 152.70
1981 4072 102.63 47.94 52.78 91.29 169.21
1982 3974 108.89 50.10 56.83 98.15 175.15
1983 3749 117.11 54.40 60.33 105.69 190.41
1984 3755 124.71 59.71 62.811 1 0.22 206.58
1985 3775 132.56 64.68 64.94 117.65 219.00
1986 3826 143.35 71.64 69.35 126.01 240.79
1987 3962 150.49 74.20 72.42 134.40 249.69
1988 4003 163.01 83.09 75.711 45.68 274.40
1989 4086 173.93 86.57 83.38 155.14 292.80
1990 3772 191.01 95.95 91.15 169.15 320.19
1991 3886 199.59 99.41 96.19 177.71 332.81
1992 3999 205.58 97.29 101.02 185.86 339.20
1993 3800 219.84 111.99 105.47 192.97 363.91
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